Introduction
A check of the proceedings of the last three international symposia, plus the main biological control journals, confirmed that although many evaluation studies have been published, few included any economic data. Doeleman (1990) on the biological control programme against salvinia Salvinia molesta DS Mitchell and Jarvis et al. (2006) on scotch broom Cytisus scoparius (L.) Link were among the few exceptions. Dhileepan (2003) listed published evaluation studies from Australia, of which 32 reported impacts at plant level and 20 reported impacts at plant population level, but only three analysed the economic impact.
The 1996 Symposium had a session on Evaluation and Economics with three papers, of which only one (Coombs et al., 1996) analysed the economic benefits, while the 2000 Bozeman Symposium had no papers on economic analysis. The 2003 Symposium session on Risk Analysis treated this purely as biological risks with no mention of economic risks. However, Stanley and Fowler (2004) stated that economic analyses are an 'important part of resolving conflicts of interests' and 'Decision-makers often find arguments couched in monetary terms to be more convincing'. The theme Evaluation included a report of a long-term study showing massive reduction in thistles in rangelands in the western United States (Kok et al., 2004) , and other papers demonstrating impact on weed populations, but with no economic data. The only economic assessment was of the control of the waterweed Azolla filiculoides Lamarck in South Africa (McConnachie et al., 2003) .
A January 2004 conference in the United States discussed 'benefits and risks of biological control' in order to 'address critical issues facing policy makers'. However, no economic benefit/risk analyses or consideration of return on investment were included. There were 20 papers dealing with risks and how to predict and reduce these, but only one on the 'economic framework for decision-making in biocontrol' (Jetter, 2005) . In summary, although there is an increasing recognition of the need to demonstrate impact on weed populations and native biodiversity (e.g. Coombs et al., 2004; Story et al., 2006; Barton et al., 2007) , economic impact analyses remain very much the exception.
Value of economic impact assessment
Most weed biological control is funded by public money in one form or another and thus competes for funding with other government programmes. The demonstrated cost-effectiveness of a control method is a reason for continuing or increasing both the use of the method and the resources dedicated to it (Culliney, 2005; Lodge et al., 2006) . For example, net economic benefits from pre-introduction screening of plant imports is a justification both for major policy change in the United States and for the maintenance of expensive border controls in Australia (Keller et al., 2007) , and McConnachie et al. (2003) highlighted the use of cost/ benefit analyses to rank biological control against other means of control. Syrett, Briese and Hoffmann (2000) , in their excellent overall summary of economic evaluation in weed biological control, make several important and stillvalid statements. For example, it is 'important to know how successful the technique is overall. If a high proportion of programmes are successful, then the likelihood of a new programme being successful is relatively high too. ' Jetter (2005) pointed out that policy decisions are based on economic criteria, which in turn depend on the probability of success. Increasingly, risk assessment (or risk-benefit-cost assessment) is being applied worldwide to most activities. This requires identification of hazard and benefits, and then exposure analysis (quantitative assessment of probabilities/likelihood) (Sheppard et al., 2003) . It is therefore essential to know the probability that the programme will result in a positive economic outcome (i.e. economic return will exceed economic costs), which allows the calculation of the risk-weighted return of an individual investment. This can then be used to prioritise investments across the entire portfolio. Note that this is not probability of 'complete' success but the probability of a positive return on investment.
In any risk assessment, probabilities are calculated from historic data for similar activities. For this reason, it is important to include failures in the economic analysis, as only this can give real estimates of success rates while also including benefits from partial successes, which otherwise may be seriously undervalued. For weed biological control, there is therefore a need to measure all research and research-related costs from all programmes undertaken, and to assess this against all benefits gained. A similar analysis was undertaken for all programmes of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (Raitzer and Lindner, 2005) , and could be done for weed biological control on a country or state basis. Only in this way can we calculate the true probability of a positive return on investment. 'Selected' case studies where failures are not included (van Wilgen et al., 2004) are useful but do not help assess the probability of failure.
This overall approach will always underestimate benefits, because the costs are already realised and are comparatively easy to determine, while benefits can only be calculated where both the baseline data to measure change has been collected and the impact assessments have been done. Benefits may also continue to increase after the assessment period; hence, the approach is inherently conservative.
Economic impact assessment of Australian weed biological control programmes
This section is a summary of results from the publication by Page and Lacey (2006) 
Methods
Only economic costs and benefits were considered: other benefits were listed but not included in the analysis. Costs of current programmes were excluded where it was still too early for field impacts to be realised. However, completed programmes where no agents were released or established were counted as failures and the costs included in the analysis.
The first step was to assemble previously undertaken economic analyses and convert these to current values. All economic data throughout the study were converted to and are cited as 2005 Aus$ values. Available ex-ante cost-benefit analyses were recalculated in the light of actual results. The next step was to list all weed biolog-ical control programmes undertaken, including those that did not lead to releases, and assemble cost data wherever possible. Data on the costs of research and releases were usually available from internal or published reports and records. Where data were unavailable or incomplete, the duration of the research in years and the number of staff employed (usually known from reports) was used to calculate costs, using a factor of Aus$300,000 per scientist-year whether employed in Australia or overseas.
The most difficult part proved to be locating data on the economic impacts of the weeds prior to biological control. Despite careful searches of the literature, including the original reports used to justify biological control programmes, all too often there was little or no data on the value of losses due to the weed or on the cost of control, and little quantitative information on the extent of the weed or the rate of spread. However, all available information was collated and converted to 2005 Aus$ values. Independent economic data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Australian Farm Surveys were used whenever available, but ABS surveys did not include questions on the cost of weeds until 2006; therefore, comparable national data was not available.
The biological control programmes against the three floating water weeds salvinia, water hyacinth Eichhornia crassipes (Mart.) and water lettuce Pistia stratiotes L. were considered as one programme, with both costs and benefits summed into one amount. These weeds occupy the same water surfaces and each is able, if not controlled, to occupy 100% of water surfaces. Therefore, the benefits only accrue if all three are simultaneously controlled, which was achieved between 1975 and 1995.
The long and expensive programme on Noogoora burr (Xanthium occidentale Bertol.), with overseas exploration from 1930 to 1970, resulted in the establishment of three insects but no impact on the weed. A rust disease Puccinia xanthii Schw. was studied in France but not introduced on the grounds that it was insufficiently host-specific. In 1974 the same rust turned up in Brisbane and in north Queensland (Morin et al., 1996) , almost certainly illegally imported by landholders in contact with the research group. The rust spread rapidly and, together with a moth released against parthenium weed (Parthenium hysterophorus L.), has given almost complete control of Noogoora burr over most of the affected lands. As the introduction of the rust, although illegal, was a direct consequence of the biological control investigations, the benefits have been included, as economically damaging consequences, whether intended or not, have also been included in all analyses.
Information on the biological control impacts was obtained from publications, unpublished reports and personal communications from scientists involved in the projects. Proper evaluations had not been undertaken for most programmes, even for successful ones.
Where agents had established, information on spread and impact was often very incomplete, as was information on impact on the weed population. Too often, there was only expert opinion, expressed in percent reduction of the weed population, percent of the total area of weed infestation affected, and percent of years with maximal impact.
Results
Results are presented in Table 1 (summary of Table  3 .1 in Page and Lacey, 2006) . A total of 36 weed biological control programmes in Australia have been undertaken in the 100 years to 2004, but for three of these (against crofton weed Ageratina adenophora (Sprengel), St John's wort Hypericum perforatum L. and docks Rumex spp.), although the biological control has been largely successful, key data on costs or benefits could not be obtained. There were existing economic cost/benefit analyses for eight programmes (e.g. Adamson and Bray, 1999) , though some (e.g. Nordblom et al., 2002) were ex-ante studies, and actual realised benefits had never been assessed.
Of the 33 programmes with economic data, no agents were ever released or established for five of these. Economic benefits were zero in a further four where established agents have, to date, proven ineffective. All remaining programmes returned economic benefits. In three (alligator weed Alternanthera philoxeroides (Martius), groundsel bush Baccharis halimifolia L. and Sida spp.), although successful control of the weed was achieved, the benefit/cost ratio was less than 1 because the direct economic impact of the weed was small. For some others where the benefit/cost ratio is <1, the benefits are still increasing and the assessments may be premature.
Seventeen programmes out of the 33 assessed returned a positive return on investment; i.e. economic benefits exceeded costs. Thirteen of these have resulted in very large economic benefits-the prickly pear (Opuntia spp.) programme, but also those against ragweed Ambrosia artemisiifolia L., nodding thistle Carduus nutans L., skeleton weed Chondrilla juncea L., rubber vine Cryptostegia grandiflora R. Br., Paterson's curse Echium plantagineum L., harrisia cactus Harrisia martinii (Labouret), giant sensitive plant Mimosa diplotricha C. Wright, Onopordum thistles, parthenium weed, the three water weeds, ragwort Senecio jacobaea L., and Noogoora burr. Surprisingly, the programmes against lantana Lantana camara L. and blackberry Rubus fruticosus L. agg., both generally considered to be still unsuccessful, returned positive cost/benefit ratios because the economic losses from these two weeds are so great that relatively small reductions in these losses are worth a great deal of money. On the other hand, the successful control of bridal creeper Asparagus asparagoides (L.) did not result in large economic gains because it is almost entirely Costs also varied greatly. Some programmes continued over decades, with years of overseas research and the employment of several scientists; the most expensive being that against Mimosa pigra L., with a total cost of Aus$21.6 million. The cheapest successful programme was against annual ragweed at a cost of Aus$0.6 million. This cost was low because the successful agents were imported for the control of the closely related parthenium weed, and the only additional costs were for extra releases in ragweed areas. Two other insects from the US were tested, but this was undertaken alongside another major project and costs were minimal. However, median cost for the 17 successful programmes (including bridal creeper, groundsel bush, and blackberry) was Aus$7 million and the duration 14 to 27 years. It is unrealistic to expect good results for smaller investments (cf Coombs et al., 2004) .
As was expected, benefits from the control of the prickly pears were enormous. For simplicity, only data from the statistical area of the Darling Downs in southern Queensland were used in the calculations. This is a large and rich agricultural area which was almost totally unusable due to prickly pear until after the impact of cactoblastis in the early 1930s. Benefits from infested land in central and north Queensland and in New South Wales have not been included; their inclusion might double the measured economic return. In the calculations, economic benefits from land under cultivation were considered to have ceased in the 1960s because the larger machines available from the 1950s can handle even land densely infested with prickly pear. However, in land used for grazing, there is still no other economic control for prickly pears. Social and medical benefits from reduction in injuries and infections due to spines were not considered.
The overall benefit/cost ratio was 23.1 for the 28 programmes where data could be analysed-an astonishing result. Even if the iconic prickly pear success is excluded, the overall benefit/cost ratio is 12.3. Out of the total 36 programmes (including those where economic analysis was not possible), only nine were failures, with few or no economic benefits.
Issues for the future
There are two major messages from this study: the large benefits from even partial control of major and widespread weeds such as lantana and blackberry, and the overwhelming importance of documenting the economic costs of the target weed at the start of a biological control programme. The key issue is to quantify the economic costs of the target weed at the start, so that the benefits from any reduction in its abundance can in turn be quantified.
Therefore, the first step, unfortunately often omitted, is a good economic assessment of the economic losses caused by the weed; e.g. for Melaleuca quinquenervia (Cav.) in Florida (Diamond and Davies, 1991; Turner et al., 1998) and for Tamarix spp. in the United States [Zavaleta (2000) and reviews by Culliney (2005) and Coombs et al. (2004) ]. Ideally, this information should be part of an ex-ante benefit/cost study prior to starting any biological control programme. This is best done by independent economists and made part of the decision process (Greer and Sheppard, 1990; Jarvis et al., 2006) . Key principles are transparency; i.e. key assumptions, data sources, and data treatment must be clearly described and explained; and analytical rigour in the use of the data (Raitzer and Lindner, 2005) . If the cost basis used is made explicit, studies can be critiqued by others and future updating undertaken. For example, a study on the productivity benefits from parthenium biological control (Adamson and Bray, 1999 ) used a range of 80 to 120 cents per kg for the price of cattle. Within three years, market prices more than doubled to 200 to 400 cents per kg, and the economic benefits increased accordingly.
As part of an ex-ante analysis, the question must be asked: 'If the target weed is removed, would yield losses/weed control costs be reduced?' If the target weed would be replaced by other weeds and control costs would not fall, then a biological control programme Shaded data are from earlier studies, not included in overall benefit/cost ratio. Three programmes-Ageratina adenophora (crofton weed), Hypericum perforatum (St John's wort), Rumex spp. (docks)-were excluded for lack of economic data, but all resulted in significant control of the weed. should not be started. If, however, control of the replacement weeds would be cheaper or yield losses be reduced, there would still be an economic benefit. For example, in Indonesia and elsewhere, the weed chromolaena, Chromolaena odorata (L.), often replaced other weeds including lantana, which then return once chromolaena has been controlled. However, control costs (or production losses) for chromolaena greatly exceed those from lantana; hence, there is still a benefit from its successful biological control even if lantana subsequently re-invades. Other variables can also influence costs; for example, chromolaena is a weed in oil palm plantations in both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, but in Indonesia, the oil palms are much more densely planted so that the weed is shaded out in mature plantations and control is only needed for five years. Costs are therefore much greater in Papua New Guinea where control is needed for the full 25-year life of the plantation. With weedy trees in South Africa, 70% of the losses are due to reductions in water flows (van Wilgen et al., 2004) , which would not apply in other countries with different native floras or different hydrology.
Quick and dirty or 'scientific'?
"There is often a painful choice in…economic analyses…one may choose only two among the three characteristics: fast, accurate and cheap!" (T. Nordblom, 2006, unpublished paper) . The decision has to be based on the objective -to produce scientific papers in the highest-impact journals, or to convince policy makers and national governments? A recent discussion on the assessment of augmentative biological control (used in greenhouse and other horticultural crops) deals with exactly this problem-whether it is necessary to have 'scientifically valid studies' or whether reduced industry use of pesticides is sufficient (van Lenteren, 2006; Collier and Steenwyk, 2006) . To quote: "(the issue is) what represents convincing evidence", "In our view, the type of evidence that makes a convincing case for efficacy…is quantitative data from replicated field experiments with valid control plots. The data should also be published in a peer-reviewed journal instead of the "grey" literature…" and "implementation [by farmers] is not equivalent to quantitative data from scientifically rigorous studies." (Collier and Steenwyk, 2006 p.120) .
However, economic analyses for policy purposes are rarely, if ever, published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The recent Stern Review 'The Economics of Climate Change' first appeared as a government document in 2006, then on their website with comments and postscript reports, and in 2007 was published as hardcopy by Cambridge University Press. For a more relevant, less-prestigious example, the Raitzer and Lindner (2005) review was published by ACIAR in their Impact Assessment Series, put on their website, and is obtainable only from them. A related issue is the level of proof required. Detailed scientific studies can be used to demonstrate impact of agents in small-scale studies (e.g. Dhileepan, 2001) but this does not demonstrate landscape-scale reduction in weed impacts. Alternatively, independent economic measures, or properly conducted end-user surveys (e.g. Ireson et al., 2007) may demonstrate cost reductions over several years, but with only correlative evidence that this is due to the impacts of biological control. Ideally, there should be both: detailed in-field evaluations using agent exclusion methods on plots planted to obtain pre-control levels of the weed, demonstrating increased production and/or reduced control costs, and supported by independent evidence of enduser cost savings.
However, it is equally acceptable, and much cheaper, to start with end-user results, such as the reduction in livestock deaths used by Coombs et al. (1996) in their assessment of the impact of the ragwort biological control programme in Oregon. They used the dramatic fall over a 20-year period in livestock deaths from pyrrolizidine alkaloid poisoning at local veterinary laboratories as a measure of benefits. Data for the estimate of programme costs were largely available. They calculated a 15:1 benefit cost ratio at 7% discount, and an annual benefit of $5 million. Correlative analysis based on industry-wide data is widely accepted as scientifically valid for other policy decisions such as health interventions (e.g. Productivity Commission, 2005), and it is time to recognise that it is equally valid for biological control.
Conclusion
If the overall objective of a weed biological control programme is to reduce the weed's harmful impact, then Key Performance Indicators (KPI) will measure the degree to which this has been achieved, and assessment protocols must be designed to measure these KPIs. This means the initial state prior to the biological control programme must be adequately recorded. For most weeds, even nonproduction impacts have an economic aspect-if control was cheap or easy, the community would not permit weeds to take over environmental areas. It is the economic cost that makes removal and restoration unviable except for very small areas.
Economic impact is the sum of many factors: loss of agricultural productivity; extent of infestation, actual and potential; spread rate; cost of removal; and frequency of recurrence. Measurement of these at the start, even if only on a coarse scale, is essential to make future assessments possible. This is most easily achieved by developing an ex-ante cost-benefit study for each programme (Coombs et al., 2004) . Such analyses immediately clarify where data are not available, as well as identifying the critical outcomes desired. In a long programme, the analysis can be repeated after several years, when more information is available (e.g. whether suitable agents can be found and established; spread rate of weed). Comparison over several years may identify significant gains even from 'unsuccessful' programmes (Hoffmann and Moran, in these proceedings). Ex-ante studies, using realistic probabilities of success based on historic rates for the country and type of weed, and taking into account the full range of potential costs and benefits, are powerful tools to convince funding agencies. In time, ex-post analyses based on these data will clarify the true probabilities of failure, and consequently, return-on-investment for weed biological control. 'Halfway' benefit/cost analysis, when agent spread and impact are known, can also help decide whether to spend more resources on increased releases to achieve faster results (Nordbloom et al., 2002) .
The key messages from our study, therefore, were: biological control is a very cost-effective method and has given excellent returns-on-investment for Australian governments; indeed, the only better investment in weed management is expenditure to prevent new incursions; and organizations and governments undertaking biological control need to ensure adequate economic data is collected at the start of the programmes and at intervals throughout.
